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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THOMAS B. MOONEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7373 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the appellant's "statement of case" includes 
some of the facts, it is argumentative in form, and misstates 
and omits many important parts of the record. It is neces-
sary, therefore, for respondent to restate to some extent 
the facts outlined by appellant and also to set forth the 
omitted references. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
The plaintiff, Thomas B. Mooney, a citizen and resi-
dent of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, filed a 
complaint in this case in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on May 31, 1949 (R. 
1-6). The complaint named as defendant, The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a foreign corpora-
tion authorized to do business in the State of Utah. The 
plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 51, and the 
Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, on account of 
an accident and injuries occurring in the State of Colorado 
on January 5, 1949 (R. 1-2). In response to this complaint, 
the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the basis of 
forum non conveniens (R. 9-15). The Motion to Dismiss 
was filed June 20, 1949, and set forth the grounds for dis-
missal in considerable detail, and in addition was supported 
by an affidavit of counsel covering substantially the same 
factual allegations (R. 12-15). Thereafter, plaintiff's coun-
sel "noticed" for hearing the Motion to Dismiss before the 
trial court at 2:00P.M. on June 27, 1949 (R. 16). During 
the noon hour (R. 41) on the same day as the scheduled 
hearing, plaintiff served upon defendant's counsel a docu-
ment entitled "Answer In Opposition To Motion To Dis-
miss" (R. 17), which admitted and denied various of the 
facts set forth in the affidavit supporting the defendant's 
motion. 
At the scheduled hearing at 2 :00 P. M. that day, coun-
sel for defendant called to the attention of the trial court 
the fact that plaintiff had only just served a counter af-
fidavit apparently traversing the facts contained in de-
That 
:::: th: 
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fendant's affidavit, and the trial court was asked to con-
tinue the hearing to a later date in order that the defend-
ant might present witnesses to support its position (R. 41). 
In the alternative, defense counsel indicated his willingness 
to proceed at once by testifying himself to the facts con-
tained in the defendant's affidavit upon the basis of in-
formation and belief, provided plaintiff's counsel would 
waive objections to the competancy of such proof (R. 41). 
Mr. B. E. Roberts, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, 
immediately replied that he had "no objection to that at 
all" (R. 41). On the basis of this understanding, Mr. Clif-
ford L. Ashton, one of the attorneys for the defendant, there-
upon took the witness-stand and upon the basis of informa-
tion and belief, testified as follows (R. 41-53) : 
That he was one of the attorneys representing the de-
fendant; that he had signed the defendant's affidavit in 
support of the Motion to Dismiss (R. 41). In order for the 
defendant to present its position at the trial of the case, 
it would be necessary to bring to Salt Lake City from 
Colorado an estimated number of ten witnesses; that these 
witnesses consisted of the train crew members and three 
doctors who had examined the plaintiff (R. 42). All ten 
witnesses resided in Colorado within convenient distance 
to both federal and district courts located in Denver, Colo-
rado; that both of such courts in Denver had jurisdiction 
of the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff. Denver was 
located approximately 570 miles from Salt Lake City. The 
Colorado witnesses referred to, including the three doctors 
(and there might be four doctors, depending on the plain-
tiff's case) could not be compelled to come to Salt Lake City 
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to testify. No process was available to the defendant to 
compel the attendance of these witnesses; that their at-
tendance could be obtained only by meeting their own terms 
of compensation and expense allowances. The cost of pro-
curing the personal attendance of these witnesses in Salt 
Lake County would be expensive and burdensome to the 
defendant, and would represent costs which could not be 
recovered by the defendant even in the event defendant were ): · 
successful in the defense of the action (R. 43). If the wit-
nesses resided within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, the defendant 
could subpoena them and the amount which would be paid 
them as witnesses would be the amount permitted by the 
state law and would be recoverable in the event the defend-
ant should win the suit, but if the defendant had to bring 
these, witnesse_$ from Colorado on their own terms, they .:ili1 wi 
could ·not be secured for a trial in Salt Lake City except :t~~ !1 
by paying them a reasonable amount per day, plus travel 
expenses and other costs. The present case could not be ade- Jti!mil 
quately or understandingly tried without the presence of the ~aa 
ten witnesses referred to. It would be unsatisfactory sub-
stitute for these witnesses to use depositions taken in an-
other state, because the jurors and the court can not see 
the witnesses or determine their credibility and the weight 
which should be given to their testimony (R. 44). If this 
case were tried in Salt Lake City instead of Colorado where 
the accident occurred, it would be impossible for the jury to 
view the Safety Appliance equipment allegedly involved in 
the accident, and it might become very material at the trial 
for the jury to examine this equipment. Of course, the 
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equipment located and maintained in Colorado might be 
brought to Salt Lake City, but it would be an added expense 
not recoverable by the defendant (R. 44). Of the ten wit-
nesses desired by the defendant, at least three are practicing 
physicians and doctors who reside in Colorado; that these 
doctors are not employed by the defendant, but by an 
association of railroad employees. The defendant has no 
control over these doctors by reason of their employment 
relationship. The defendant can not secure the presence of 
these doctors in Salt Lake City without meeting their pro-
fessional terms (R. 45). The defendant estimates that the 
cost of obtaining the attendance of the ten witnesses re-
ferred to, of transporting them to Salt Lake City and of 
paying their travel and maintenance expenses and compen-
~ sating them for their services would approximate $1,500; 
that the witness asked his office to prepare an estimate of 
this cost for him, and the estimate prepared was slightly 
larger than the figure of $1,500, but in order to be within 
a safe limit, the witness reduced the estimate to $1,500 (R. 
45). In addition, the trial of this case in Salt Lake County 
would further add to the congestion of the calendar of that 
court and would delay the trial of cases involving local 
residents and citizens and local problems of pressing im-
portance (R. 46); that the court was more informed about 
this congestion than the witness and probably would take 
~ judicial notice of it. It was a fact at the present time that 
the trial courts hearing cases in the District Court of Salt 
~: Lake County were unable to handle all the cases set. The 
[J taxpayers of this state were required to wait an undue length 
of time for cases to be tried, because many cases were 
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brought into this jurisdiction from outside the state, that :i~rn 
"~oOI is, the cases were brought from another state where the 
alleged accident happened and where all the witnesses re-
sided. The local juries of this state were required to bear 
the burden of jury service in a controversy which had no 
relationship to this state or community, and the courts of 
this state were required to pay the expense of litigation far ~~0001 
removed from the point of its origin (R. 47). t 
Upon cross examination by plaintiff's counsel, the ~n~n 
witness Ashton further testified : That the defendant's -~~in£ 
Claim Department in Colorado had made an investigation /!Da,t 1 
of this case and had referred to the attention of the wit- ,lammg 
ness' office the names of all witnesses present at the time ~ o. 
of the plaintiff's alleged accident, who saw the equipment ~cm~lo: 
alleged to be defective, and who talked to the plaintiff clotesl 
immediately before and after his alleged injury (R. 48). ~lioulu 
The witness was unable to state the names of the ten wit- 'l.l1naol 
nesses at the moment, because the claim file had been re- ::~d 
turned to Denver, but it would be quite easy to secure the MDaVI 
names from Claim Department in Denver. The ten witnesses 
referred to all were witnesses to things material to the case; 
ll!lhaJ 
.<Iiden a 
that the seven train crew witnesses would testify to the con- l 
dition of the alleged defective brake and the alleged unsafe ''!81 
:i1rtau 
condition of the equipment where the brake was located; that 
all seven witnesses were present and were able so to testify. 
Whether all seven witnesses will be called to testify would de-
pend a great deal on the testimony produced by the plaintiff; 
that defendant certainly would have to have the witnesses 
~'· present at the trial until after the plaintiff had rested his 
case (R. 49). The witness could not state the names of the 
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:~. ~ three doctors required as witnesses, but their names were 
:::, easily obtainable; that the doctors would testify to their ex-
~'ti\ amination of the plaintiff. Their testimony might be cumula-
.. :~ tive, but as a matter of fact the witness thought it would not 
~· be (R. 50). The claim file now in Denver had been examined 
l~· by the witness before he prepared the affidavit in support of 
·· the Motion to Dismiss. The three doctors mentioned saw 
the plaintiff on different occasions; that the defendant 
would not want to try this case without having all three 
~: 
~:~ 
doctors present in court so that they could be called as wit-
nesses in the event it became necessary (R. 51). It was not 
true that the only difference between trying the case in 
Denver instead of Salt Lake, so far as costs were concerned, 
consisted of the matter of transportation. Whenever rail-
-- road employees were brought from Colorado to the State of 
Utah to testify they were paid not only the amount of money 
-- they would have earned if they had worked that day, but also 
a reasonable amount to compensate them for food and lodg-
ing while in Salt Lake; that in every case the wages they 
would have earned at their regular employment would be 
:C larger than the statutory witness fee (R. 51). Of course, 
xli the defendant would have to pay the wages of employees 
called as witnesses even if the case were tried in Denver, 
~ but certainly three or four days time would be saved if the 
·.- case were tried in Denver (R. 52). The doctors would have 
-·- to be paid their professional fee while absent from Denver, 
and three or four days consumed in travel and waiting upon 
~~ a trial can cost a lot of money with doctors. It was the 
]~ witness' understanding that a doctor called as a witness 
:d: 
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received $50 a day from the time he left Colorado until he 
returned. The defendant had been able to secure doctors 
as witness~s in other cases if these terms were met; the 
same was true of employee witnesses; that depositions of 
out of state witnesses could be taken (R. 52). 
No evidence or testimony of any kind was offered on 
behalf of the plaintiff at the hearing (R. 53). The denials 
and allegations contained in the plaintiff's "Answer In Op-
position To Motion To Dismiss" were not supported in any 
manner. The controverted factual and legal questions were 
then argued to the trial court by counsel for both parties 
(R. 53). Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss (R. 53). Two days later, on June 29, 1949, 
the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 21-27). The Findings of Fact found the contro-
verted factual issues in favor of the defendant, substantially 
as set forth in defendant's supporting affidavit and as testi-
fied to at the hearing by defendant's counsel. The trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were as 
follows (R. 21-26) : 
"The above entitled matter coming on regularly 
to be heard before the above entitled court on the 
27th day of June, 1949, upon the defendant's motion 
to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff on file here-
in, and upon the plaintiff's ans)Ver in opposition to 
the said motion to dismiss. The defendant introduced 
evidence in support of the issues raised by its affi-
davit in support of its motion and by plaintiff's an-
swer thereto. No evidence was offered or introduced 
by the plaintiff. The court having fully considered 
the pleadings, the evidence, and the arguments of 
counsel for the respective parties, and being fully 
un 
ou 
~l 
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advised in the premises, now makes and enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
"1. Clifford L. Ashton is one of the attorneys 
for the defendant The Denver and Rio Grande Wes-
tern Railroad Company, and in such capacity is fa-
miliar with the facts and circumstances connected 
with the above entitled cause of action filed by the 
plaintiff herein. 
"2. The cause of action referred to in the plain-
tiff's complaint and on account of which damages are 
claimed by the plaintiff, arose out of an alleged acci-
dent and alleged injuries whieh occurred on January 
5, 1949, in the State of Colorado. The plaintiff named 
in said complaint is now and at the time of the al-
leged accident and injuries was a citizen and resi-
dent of the City and County of Denver, State of Colo-
rado. 
"3. The defendant, The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, is a citizen of the State 
of Delaware, but operates a line of railroad in Colo-
rado and Utah. The defendant's general offices and 
headquarters are located in Denver, Colorado, and 
the major portion of its business is located in and 
carried on within the State of Colorado. Defendant 
does business within the State of Utah only as a for-
eign corporation. 
"4. Plaintiff's alleged cause of action is brought 
under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, 45, U. S. C. A. Sec. 51, and the Safety Ap-
pliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, et seq. Both fed-
eral and state courts are located within the City and 
County of Denver, Colorado, and at other convenient 
places in the State of Colorado, and said courts are 
open and have jurisdiction to entertain and adjud·I-
cate the plaintiff's alleged present cause of action if 
said cause of action were filed in the courts of Colo-
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rado, and the general law applicable to the determi-
nation of plaintiff's alleged cause of action is the 
same in Colorado as it is in the State of Utah. 
"5. In order to try plaintiff's alleged cause of 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County at Salt Lake City, Utah, it would be 
necessary for the plaintiff to travel to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, from Denver, Colorado, where he now resides. 
In order for the defendant properly to defend said 
action and present all the facts at a trial of the case 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, it would be necessary for the 
defendant to bring to Salt Lake City, Utah, from the 
State of Colorado, an estimated number of ten wit-
nesses. Each and all of these ten witnesses now and 
at all times mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint 
reside in and are citizens of the State of Colorado 
and reside within a convenient distance to courts lo-
cated in the City and County of Denver, Colorado. 
Denver, Colorado, is located approximately 570 miles 
from Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"6. The aforesaid necessary witnesses for the 
defendant cannot be compelled by judicial process to 
come to Salt Lake City, Utah, and to testify in the 
trial of this case and their attendance at a trial in 
Salt Lake City can be obtained only by meeting 
their own terms of compensation and expense allow-
ances. The cost of procuring the personal attendance 
of such witnesses in the courts of Salt Lake County 
will be expensive and burdensome to the defendant. 
The major portion of such costs cannot be recovered 
by the defendant, even in the event the defendant 
should be successful in the defense of the plaintiff's 
action. The testimony of these necessary witnesses 
residing in the State of Colorado cannot be adequately 
presented and made intelligible to a jury, except by 
oral testimony and explanation in the court room at 
the time of trial. Such testimony cannot be adequate-
ly or understandably presented by witnesses testify-
lur 
r~a 
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ing by deposition only or through written interroga-
tories, because of the inability of jurors to determine 
intelligently the credibility of such unseen witnesses. 
Under such circumstances, testimony and evidence by 
deposition is frequently disregarded or given scant 
consideration by jurors, even though such testimony 
might be given full weight if presented orally in the 
presence of the jury. Moreover, trial of this 'case 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, instead of in the State of 
Colorado where the alleged accident occurred, would 
prevent a view by the jury of the premises, facilities 
and instrumentalities involved, and thereby would 
encourage and facilitate confusion, distortion and 
misrepresentation of the pertinent facts incident to 
the claims of both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
"7. Of the estimated ten necessary witnesses 
for the defendant, who reside in or near Denver, Colo-
rado, at least three of said witnesses are practicing 
physicians and doctors. The other seven witnesses 
are railroad employees. The physicians and doctors 
mentioned are actively engaged in their practices and 
it would be difficult for the defendant to persuade 
them to leave their practices, except upon the prom-
ise of substantial fees and remuneration. The esti-
mated cost to the defendant of transporting these ten 
necessary witnesses to Salt Lake City, Utah, of pay-
ing their travel and maintenance expenses, of com-
pensating them for their services while absent from 
their usual occupations, and of compensating other 
persons to substitute for them in their customary 
occupations, would amount to approximately $1500.-
00. The major portion of this expense could not be 
recovered by the defendant in its cost bill, even in 
the event the defendant were successful in the de-
fense of this action. The burden of assuming this un-
necessary cost and expense, places an undue and un-
fair hardship and disadvantage upon the defendant. 
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"8. The trial of this case in this court will fur-
ther add to the congestion of an already badly con-
gested and crowded calendar in this court, and will 
interfere with the orderly and efficient administra-
tion of justice in this court. The calendar of cases 
set in the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah in and for Salt Lake County for the month 
of June, 1949, shows that a total of 165 civil cases 
are at issue and set for trial. Only about half of this 
total of cases can or will be disposed of by this court 
during the month of June. The crowded condition 
of the calendar also has necessitated the assignment 
of an extra judge to this court from another Judicial 
District of the state. The court calendar for the sin-
gle month of June, 1949, also indicates that of the 
total number of civil cases assigned for trial, 29 cases 
involve personal injury suits against three different 
railroad companies operating in the State of Utah. 
Of this number, 17. cases were brought by non-resi-
dent plaintiffs, suing on actions arising outside the 
State of Utah. In all17 cases, the non-resident plain-
tiffs are represented by the same law firm located 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The trial of this case in this 
court will delay the trial of cases involving local resi-
dents and citizens and local problems of pressing im-
portance. The trial of this and similar cases arising 
out of events occurring in a state other than Utah, 
and between parties who are non-residents of Utah, 
increases the administrative costs of local courts of 
Utah to the detriment of the citizens and taxpayers 
of Utah, without the citizens and taxpayers of Utah 
securing any commensurate benefits. Also, local jur-
ies of Utah are required to bear the burden of service 
tit 
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in a controversy which bears no relationship to their 
State and community. The courts of the State of ~r 
. fm Utah are required to pay the expense and bear the 
burden of litigation far removed from its point of 
origin. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"9. The plaintiff's alleged cause of action can 
conveniently be tried in the courts of Colorado, where 
the accident complained of occurred, where the plain-
tiff now resides, where defendant has its headquar-
ters and general offices, where all the necessary wit-
nesses reside, and where the instrumentalities in-
volved in connection with the alleged accident can be 
viewed more readily. 
"Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court now draws the following 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
"1. This court has jurisdiction of the above en-
titled action, but it is not mandatory upon the court 
to accept such juris diction. 
"2. It is within the inherent power of this court 
in its discretion to decline jurisdiction of litigation 
on the basis of forum non conveniens between two 
non-residents when its acceptance will and does in-
terfere with its orderly and efficient administration 
of justice, unnecessarily burdens the court, places an 
unfair burden upon one or the other of the parties 
to the litigation, and when such litigation can be con-
ducted in an available forum in the state of plaintiff's 
residence and where the accident occurred, which is 
more conveniently located for the parties, and where 
the elements of undue cost, vexation, frustration and 
harassment to the parties do not exist. 
"3. Defendant is entitled to have made and en-
tered herein an order granting its motion to dismiss 
the complaint of the plaintiff on file herein, without 
prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to re-commence 
or prosecute the same in any suitable or convenient 
forum other than the above entitled court." 
It will be noted that the foregoing Findings of Fact 
follow the defendant's affidavit in support of defendant's 
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Motion to Dismiss and the testimony of defendant's counsel 
at the hearing, except for certain additional findings in 
paragraph 8 with respect to the congested condition of the 
calendar in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County (R. 24-2'5). At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, 
the trial court was requested to take judicial notice of the con-
dition of the court calendar (R. 46). In compliance with such 
request, at the time the trial judge ruled on the motion, he 
specifically stated that he would take judicial notice of the 
crowded condition of the calendar, adding that that was the 
reason why he, a judge from another judicial district, was 
present in Salt Lake for a three-day period (R. 53). The 
Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 8 are matters of 
public record, ascertainable from the records in the Clerk's 
office of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County. 1 
After the trial court had signed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it thereafter entered on the same 
day its formal Order, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint 
without prejudice (R. 27). The next day, June 30, 1949, the 
plaintiff served and filed a document entitled "Objections 
to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (R. 28-33). 
At no time did the plaintiff ever "notice" for hearing his ' 
so-called "Objections" or request a ruling thereon by the 
trial court. Instead, on the following day, July 1, 1949, 
plaintiff served and filed a self-serving affidavit, intimat-
1 Courts of this state will take judicial notice of facts of public record. 
See Utah Code Anno. (1943:), 104-46-1 (3), and Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones, 
.. Utah ... , 202 P. (2d) 892, 89'5. In State v. Bates 22 Utah 65, 68, 
61 P. 905, it was said that "courts will generally tak~ notice of what-
ever ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdic-
tion." 
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ing that the trial judge had signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at a different time than had been in-
dicated in some previous conversation which allegedly had 
taken place between plaintiff's counsel and the court. Of 
course, the defendant had no knowledge of any such ex 
pa'rte conversations either then or now. At no time did the 
plaintiff ask for any kind of reconsideration of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, nor at any 
time did the plaintiff request any ruling or disposition of 
the document entitled "Objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law." Instead, at the same time and on 
the same day as plaintiff's affidavit was served, the plain-
tiff filed its Notice of Appeal in this case (R. 36). 
Throughout his brief the appellant makes many state-
ments of alleged fact which are either entirely outside of 
or contrary to the record in this case. 
On page 5 of his brief, appellant attributes to the wit-
ness Ashton the statement that it would cost in excess of 
$1,500 to bring the three doctor witnesses from Denver to 
Salt Lake City. To the contrary, both the affidavit in sup-
port of the motion to dismiss which was signed by Ashton 
(R. 14) and Ashton's oral testimony at the hearing made 
it clear that the figure of $1,500 represented the estimated 
cost of bringing ten witnesses, including the three doctors, 
to Salt Lake City (R. 45-46). This estimated cost included 
items of expense consisting of transportation, maintenance 
and compensation for services (R. 45). 
On page 22 of his brief, appellant states that the docu-
ment entitled ''Objections to Findings of Fact and Con-
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elusions of Law" was supported by an affidavit of counsel, 
Brigham E. Roberts. The fact, as shown by the record, is that 
this affidavit was served the day following the. day on 
which the "Objections" were served (R. 33, 35). The af-
fidavit was filed along with the plaintiff's Notice of Appeal 
(R. 36). The obvious purpose of this affidavit was not to 
support the "Objections to the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law" but rather to make prejudicial and self-
serving statements for inclusion in the record on appeal. 
The affidavit contains factual allegations entirely outside 
the record, including various innuendos and charges con-
cerning the conduct of the trial judge. This material then 
was included in the record on appeal, in a manner designed 
to exclude both the trial judge and defendant from replying 
thereto. 
On pages 58, 110 and 117 of his brief, appellant inserts 
statements contradicting the fact that Judge Hendricks was 
holding court in the Third Judicial District because of the 
congested condition of the trial calendar in Salt Lake County. 
How and where appellant obtains his intimate knowledge 
concerning the internal affairs of the Third Judicial District 
Court is not revealed. The facts of record in this case are 
certainly entirely to the contrary. The transcript of the 
testimony at the hearing, indicates that Judge Hendricks 
was sitting in Salt Lake County "upon written invitation" 
(R. 40), and at the time of ruling upon the defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, Judge Hendricks stated that he would 
"take judicial notice of the crowded condition of the Salt 
Lake calendar" adding, "that's why I am here today and 
Saturday and another day" (R. 53). 
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~ Again, on pages 58 and 110, the appellant criticizes 
what he terms the "summary" action of the trial court in 
" ruling "without argument or presentation of authority." 
et But again, the record reveals that both sides were given 
~ full opportunity to present any and all testimony desired 
(R. 53). The record further indicates that counsel for the 
parties argued the issues to the court, even though the re-
porter did not transcribe the arguments (R. 53). The trial 
.. court thereafter ruled on the pending motion. Appellant's 
;: real objection, of course, is not based upon either the ade-
quacy or propriety of the hearing before the trial court, 
~. but rather upon the fact that the ruling was contrary to 
his position. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
"'' THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY kCT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE STATE COURTS TO ENTERTAIN 
SUITS ARISING UNDER THE ACT. 
ot: 
The venue provision of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act is contained in Section 6 of the Act. It provides as 
follows: 
"Under this chapter an action may be brought 
in a district court of the United States, in the district 
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the 
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall 
be doing business at the time of commencing such ac-
tion. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States under this chapter shall be concurrent with· 
that of the courts of the several States." (As amended 
June 25, 1948, 45 U. S. C., Sec. 56.) 
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It is to be noted that the foregoing section contains 
detailed venue provisions with respect to actions brought 
in the federal courts. The section contains no such pro-
visions with respect to actions brought in the state courts, 
but merely presupposes the existence of jurisdiction in the 
courts of the several states. Since the venue privilege pre-
scribed by Section 6 is limited to federal courts, it neces-
sarily follows that the venue of such actions in state courts 
is controlled by local state law. Barton v. Delaware, L. & 
W. R. Co., 218 App. Div. 748, 218 N. Y. S. 171. For this 
reason, cases dealing with the compulsive duty of federal 
courts to entertain jurisdiction of actions under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act must be distinguished from author-
ities involving the question whether state courts may for 
good reason decline to exercise jurisdiction of such actions. 
The importance of this distinction is recognized in an 
annotation in 158 A. L. R. 1022, 1025, 1033, which points 
out that cases holding state courts have the power to de-
cline jurisdiction of an action under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act are not authoritative upon the same question 
with respect to federal courts, and vice versa. To the same 
effect is Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) 1019, 
1020 (C. C. A. 6) holding that although a federal court 
could not refuse to exercise jurisdiction of a case arising 
under the Act, a contrary rule exists with respect to such 
an action in a state court, the opinion stating: "Authorities 
holding that state courts may by reason of local law under 
like circumstances in their discretion refuse to entertain a 
suit under the Act are not controlling, for the statute does 
not impose a duty upon state courts as against a valid excuse, 
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:._ but rather confers a power.'' The principle also was af-
firmed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Douglas v. New York, N. 
H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387, 388, 49 S. Ct. 355, 356, 
in the following language: 
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employ-
ers' Liability Act that statute does not purport to re-
quire State Courts to entertain suits arising under 
it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the 
authority of the United States is concerned ... there 
is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to 
force a duty upon such Courts as against an other-
wise valid excuse." 
The above quotation was reiterated with approval by 
the United State Supreme Court in the recent case of Herb 
v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 120, 65 S. Ct. 459, 461. 
It is now a well settled proposition that Section 6 of 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended, was not 
intended to, and does not, impose a duty upon a state court 
to exercise jurisdiction under the act, merely because a 
state court has properly acquired jurisdiction of the person 
of the defendant : 
Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co.; 246 N. Y. 244, 158 
N. E. 508, 54 A. L. R. 1522, (reversing 220 
App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. S. 332). 
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. 
S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355. 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459. 
Ex Parte Crandall, 53 F. (2d) 969, affirming 
52 F. (2d) 650, cert. denied 285 U. S. 540, 
52 S. Ct. 312. 
Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 Ohio St. 32·5, 
140 N. E. 94, writ of error dismissed, 266 
U. S. 639, 45 S. Ct. 97. 
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Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2, writ 
of error dismissed, 245 U. S. 675, 38 S. Ct. 
10. 
Note (1945) 158 A. L. R. 1022. 
44 Harvard Law Review, 41. 
39 Yale Law Journal, 388, 391. 
56 Yale Law Journal, 1234. 
29 Journal of the Am. Jud. Soc., 135, 146. 
In Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra, an action was 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a 
state court of New York by a resident of Connecticut against 
an Indiana railroad corporation for alleged injuries 
sustained in Michigan. Even though a state statute con-
ferred discretion upon the state court to refuse to entertain 
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a tort com-
mitted in a sister state where both parties were non-
residents, the Appellate Division of the State Supreme 
Court interpreted the Second Employers' Liability Cases 
(Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.), 223 U. S. 1, 
32 S. Ct. 169, as requiring a holding that the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act made it mandatory upon the state 
courts of New York to exercise jurisdiction in any case 
brought under the Act. But upon appeal of the case, the 
New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice 
Pound with the concurrence of a unanimous court includ-
ing Chief Justice Cardozo, took exactly the opposite view. 
The court said : 
"That Congress has undertaken to regulate the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by our courts by making compul-
sory what in other similar cases is discretionary 
seems an unreasonable conclusion and a resulting in-
vasion of the powers of our tribunals as heretofore 
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exercised. We conclude that a litigant who brings 
his action under the federal Employers' Liability Act 
stands before the court in no different attitude than 
a litigant who brings his action under the statute of 
a sister state. He may not be cast out because he is 
suing under the act of Congress. He may not enforce 
his rights merely because he is suing under the act." 
Justice Pound further pointed out that the M ondou 
case was authority for the bare proposition that state 
courts may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely be-
cause the right of action arose under a federal statute. It 
was emphasized, however, that in all cases state courts 
should act in conformity with their own general principles 
of practice and procedure. 
The decision in the Murnan case was challenged in 
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, upon the 
grounds that the discretionary power asserted by the New 
York courts under state law, violated the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Federal Constitution and also was 
repugnant to the jurisdictional provisions of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. The United States Supreme 
Court through Mr. Justice Holmes rejected both of these 
arguments, stating : 
"Construed as it has been and we believe will 
be construed the statute applies to citizens of New 
York as well as to others and puts them on the same 
footing. There is no discrimination between citizens 
as such, and none between nonresidents with regard 
to these foreign causes of action. A distinction of 
privileges according to residence may be based upon 
rational considerations and has been upheld by this 
Court, emphasizing the difference between citizen-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
ship and residence. * * * There are manifest 
reasons for preferring residents in access to often 
overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the 
fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for 
maintaining the Courts concerned. 
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employ-
ers' Liability Act that statute does not purport tore-
quire State Courts to entertain suits arising under 
it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the 
authority of the United States is concerned. It may 
very well be that if the Supreme Court of New York 
were given no discretion, being otherwise competent, 
it would be subject to a duty. But there is nothing 
in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty 
upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid ex-
cuse." 
The proposition that the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act presents no obstacle so far as state courts are con-
cerned, to proceed in accordance with their own modes of 
procedure and practice, recently was reaffirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Herb v. Pitcairn, supra. 
That case involved two separate actions under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act initially filed in one of the city 
courts of Illinois. Judgments for the plaintiffs were ob-
tained but in both cases the verdicts were later set aside. 
Before retrial of the cases, the Illinois Supreme Court 
handed down a decision holding that city courts of the state 
were without jurisdiction in any case where the cause of 
action arose outside of the city where the court was located. 
Both of the pending cases fell within this prohibition. There-
after, the plaintiffs moved for a change of venue to the 
Circuit Court of the State. The city court granted the 
motions and transferred the cases. Defendants then ap-
~.Jlr. 
Jt. ~j 
rou 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
peared in the Circuit Court and moved for dismissal ·on 
the grounds that the proceedings in the city court were 
void, that the city court had no power to transfer venue of 
the cases, and that since no action had been commenced in 
a court of competent jurisdiction, the statute of limitations 
of the Federal Act had run against the actions. The Circuit 
Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in both 
cases. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed and the cases 
then were appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
There, -the plaintiffs below claimed that the state law as in-
terpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court was discriminatory 
and unlawfully interfered with rights conferred by the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act. In rejecting these conten-
tions, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority of the 
Court, said : 
"Whether any case is pending in the Illinois 
courts is a question to be determined by Illinois law, 
as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court. For as 
we have said of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
'we deem it well to observe that there is not here in-
volved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regu-
late the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or 
affect their modes of procedure, but only a question 
of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary juris-
diction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to 
the occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those 
laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a 
right of civil recovery arising under the Act of Con-
gress, and susceptible of adjudication according to 
the prevailing rules of procedure.' Mondou v. New 
York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223. U.S. 1, 56, 57, 32 S. Ct. 
169, 178, 56, L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44. 'As to 
tl~e grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability 
Act, that statute does not purport to require State 
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Courts to entertain suits arising under it but only to 
empower them to do so, so far as the authority of the 
United States is concerned ... But there is nothing 
in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty 
upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid ex-
cuse.' 
* * * 
" ... It would not be open for us to say that the 
state in setting up a local court could not limit its 
jurisdiction to actions arising within the city for 
which it is established. 
* * * 
" ... We think that the Supreme Court [of Illi-
nois] probably has decided that as a matter of Illinois 
law no action is pending against these defendants in 
any court and that all of the proceedings have been 
of no effect whatever. 
"The freedom of the state courts so to decide is, 
of course, subject to the qualification that the cause 
of action must not be discriminated against because 
it is a federal one. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. 
Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, 78 L. Ed. 1227. But 
we cannot say that the court below, in so far as it did 
hold the city courts without power, construed the 
state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory 
fashion." 
The rule of the Douglas case, the Herb case and of the 
other authorities above cited is in no way inconsistent with 
the true import of Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 
44, 62 S. Ct. 6, and Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany, 315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827. In the Kepner case, it 
was held that a state court of Ohio had no power to enjoin 
the prosecution of an action under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act in the federal district court for the eastern 
district of New York. The decision rests upon the venue 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~f. ~. ~ 
25 
privilege with respect to actions brought in federal courts 
created by Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. As heretofore pointed out, that section confers special 
privileges upon plaintiffs so far as actions in the federal 
courts are concerned, but leaves venue problems in state 
courts under the control of the local law, either statu-
tory or judge-made. The opinion in the Kepner case 
in no way involved the discretionary power of a state court 
to dismiss an F. E. L.A. action upon the grounds of forum 
non conveniens. Moreover, since enactment of 28 U. S. C. 
Sec. 1404 (a) and the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Ex Parte Collett,.,__ U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 944, the 
holding of the Kepner case has been vitiated with respect 
to its application to an action brought in a federal court 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
In Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of a Tennessee 
state court enjoining a resident widow from prosecuting an 
action for her husband's death in a Missouri state court. 
The basis of the decision was that even though a state may 
by reason of its control over its own courts refuse to open 
them to an action under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, it does not follow that still another state (Tennessee) 
has the power to close by injunction the courts of the former 
state (Missouri) to a plaintiff with a cause of action aris-
ing under a federal statute. The Supreme Court expressly 
held that it was not dealing "with the power of Missouri 
by judicial decision or legislative enactment to regulate the 
use of its courts generally as was approved in the Douglas 
or the Chambers cases." In the course of Mr. Justice Reed's 
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majority opinion (concurred in by only two other justices) 
the statement was made that "the Missouri Court here in-
volved must permit this litigation," since "to deny citizens 
from other states, suitors under the F. E. L. A. access to its 
courts would, if it permitted access to its own citizens, 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause." But it is 
manifest that Mr. Justice Reed did not intend by this state-
ment to announce that a state court could not decline juris-
diction of a transitory cause of action under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, when empowered by local law 
as expressed by judicial decision or legislative enactment. 
This is made clear by footnote 6 to the opinion, which states: 
"Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1907) 
20'7 U. S. 142, 52. L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34, or Douglas 
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (1929) 279 U. S. 
377, 13 L. Ed. 7 4 7, 49 8. Ct. 355, do not impinge upon 
this principle. In the former case, an Ohio statute 
forbade suits in its courts for wrongful death occur-
ring in another state unless the decedent was a citi-
zen of Ohio. This court saw no discrimination against 
personal representatives of any decedent since their 
right to sue did not depend upon their citizenship but 
upon the citizenship of their decedent. In the latter 
case a statute of New York, which gave only discre-
tionary jurisdiction to suits by nonresidents but com-
pulsory jurisdiction to suits by residents was held 
valid because it treated citizens and noncitizens alike 
and tested their right to maintain an action by their 
residence or nonresidence." 
Furthermore, a majority of the justices (Mr. Justice 
Jackson in a concurring. opinion and Mr. Justice Frankfurter ' 
in a dissenting opinion joined in by the Chief Justice and by 
Justices Roberts and Byrnes), specifically disagreed with 
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the statement in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion that "the 
Missouri Court here involved must permit this litigation." 
Mr. Justice Jackson said: "I do not, however, agree with 
the statement in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion that the 
'Missouri Court here involved must permit this litigation.' 
It is very doubtful if any requirement can be spelled out of 
the Federal Constitution that a state must furnish a forum 
for a nonresident plaintiff and a foreign corporation to 
fight out issues imported from another state where the cause 
of action arose." The concurring opinion also criticized 
the system whereby a plaintiff is allowed to go "shopping for 
a forum," adding that the judiciary has never favored the 
practice of seeking out "soft spots" in the judicial system 
in which to bring particular kinds of litigation. Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter went even further, saying: "Moreover, the 
Constitution would not prevent Missouri from declining to 
entertain a suit to vindicate a Federal right, such as was 
brought here, if an action to enforce a similar non-Federal 
right would also not lie in her courts. The availability of 
state courts for the enforcement of Federal rights has not 
resulted in putting Federal rights on any different footing 
from state rights. 'A state may not discriminate against 
rights arising under Federal law,' McKnett v. St. Louis & 
S. F. R. Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 234, 78 Led 1229, 54 S. Ct. 
690, but neither the Constitution nor Congress has com-
pelled the states to discriminate in favor of Federal rights. 
And this court has expressly held that the rights created 
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act are not different 
in this respect, from other Federal rights." 
Much of appellant's brief is devoted to an argument 
that for a state court to decline jurisdiction of an F. E. L.A. 
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action would violate the privileges and immunities provision 
of the Federal Constitution. It is respectfully submitted that 
this argument definitely was laid at rest by the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Douglas v. New 
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, and the subsequent cases 
herein cited. The various cases referred to in appellant's 
brief are fully reconcilable with respondents' position that 
state courts are not required to entertain such suits "as 
against an otherwise valid excuse." For example, the ap-
pellant places great reliance upon the Second Employers' 
Liability Cases (M ondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 
223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, but the doctrine of that case was 
fully reviewed and interpreted in Murnan v. Wabash R. Co., 
supra, and the interpretation there made was expressly ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in the Douglas 
case. The M ondou case, of course, antedates the Douglas case 
by some 18 years. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 
292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, as heretofore pointed out, was 
a case in which an Alabama state court refused jurisdiction 
of an F. E. L. A. case solely upon the ground that suit was 
brought under the federal law. It was held that a state 
could not thus discriminate against a right arising under the 
federal law, but the opinion also makes clear that Congress 
has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the 
enforceme'iit of suits under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act. Hoffman v. State of Missouri ex. rel. Foraker, 
274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, involved an F. E. L. A. suit 
brought in the state of incorporation of the defendant and 
where it also was doing business. Under these circum-
stances, it was held that the suit could not be dismissed on 
··;(O 
;j(i] 
0i1. 
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the grounds it constituted a burden on interstate commerce. 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens and its application 
to a suit between non-residents of the forum was in no way 
involved. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Terte, 248 U. S. 
284, 52 S. -ct. 152, is a similar type of case in which the 
railroad company was sued in the state courts of Missouri. 
The Court held that under the facts shown the railroad 
company was not doing sufficient business in that state to 
make it amenable to process there, and that to allow suit 
to proceed would constitute a burden on interstate com-
merce. The case involved none of the questions presented 
in the instant case. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 
U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, is hereinafter cited by respondent 
in support of its position that a court has the inherent' 
power to dismiss an action on the basis of forum non con-
veniens. It is true that in the course of the opinion Mr. 
Justice Jackson made the gratuitous remark based on the 
Kepner and Miles decisions "that in cases under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, we have held a plaintiff's choice 
of a forum can not be denied on the basis of forum non 
conveniens." This dictum clearly is confined, however, to 
the special privilege of bringing F. E. L. A. actions in the 
·· federal courts. It is obvious from both the majority and 
concurring opinion in the Miles case that the quoted state-
ment has no application to the discretionary power of a 
state court to decline jurisdiction for reasons of forum non 
conveniens. Akerly v. New York Central R. R. Co., 168 F. 
(2d) 812, and Peterson v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Co., 110 Utah 514, 175 P. (2d) 7 44, are beside the point, in 
that they involve the validity of contracts attempting to ex-
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empt the railroad companies from liability to suit in certain 
courts. In both cases the contracts were held invalid under 
the prohibition imposed against such type contracts by Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In consider-
ing the effect of those cases, the distinction heretofore 
pointed out should be kept in mind, namely, that the venue 
privilege created by Section 6 of the Act is limited by its 
terms to federal courts, whereas the venue in state courts 
is controlled by local law. See 158 A. L. R. 1033. In Schendel 
v. McGee, 300 F. 273 (C. C. A. 8) and Sacco v. Baltimore 
& 0. R. Co., 56· F. Supp. 959, it was held that a federal dis-
trict court could not decline jurisdiction of an F. E. L. A. 
suit upon the grounds of a burden on interstate commerce. 
The right of a state court to decline jurisdiction upon the 
ground of forum non conveniens was not involved. Kilpat-
rick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 2) 
stands for nothing more than that the continuous solicita-
tion of business in New York constitutes sufficient "doing 
business" so as to subject a railroad company to service 
of process in that state, and that with respect to the 
issue of validity of process forum non conveniens is ir-
relevant. Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co.,· 25 Cal. (2d) 605, 
155 P. (2d) 42, 158 A. L. R. 1008, is apparent authority 
for appellant's position that a state court will not dismiss 
an F. E. L. A. action on the basis of forum non conveniens. 
The decision is bottomed, however, upon an erroneous in-
terpretation of the opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court in the Kepner and Miles cases. As stated by the an-
notation in 158 A. L. R. 1033, "neither" of these two cases 
"supports the conclusion of the California court." 
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II. 
THE STATE <COURTS OF UTAH POSSESS THE IN-
HERENT POWER TO DISMISS AN ACTION UPON 
THE BASIS OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
In state courts, generally, there exists the power to de-
cline jurisdiction of a cause of action on the basis of forum 
non conveniens. The doctrine had its inception in the early 
common law courts of Great Britain. Since early times both 
the English and Scottish courts freely have recognized and 
entertained a plea of forum non conveniens. See: Foster, 
"Place of Trial - Interstate Application of Intrastate 
Methods of Adjustment" 44 Harvard Law Review, 41, 44, 
(which traces the development of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens from the English common law to the state 
courts of this country) ; also Logan v. Bank of Scotland), 
1 K. B. 141; Longsworth v. Hope, 3 Macph. 1049·, 3 Sc. 
Sess. 3rd Series, 1049, 37 Scot. Juris. 552. In the latter 
case, Lord Deas, after holding that the court had jurisdic-
tion of the case before him, then stated : 
"The only debatable point is whether, as a mat-
ter of expediency, this is the court in which the ac-
tion (for a libel printed in defendant's, London News-
paper, all the parties to which were domiciliary resi-
dents of England, plaintiff, however, residing tem-
porarily in Scotland) ought to be tried. It is a val-
uable discretion, which is vested in every court, not 
to exercise its jurisdiction if there are grounds for 
holding that, by the exercise of that jurisdiction, the 
defendant, who objects to it, will be put to an unfair 
disadvantage which he would not be subjected to in 
another accessible and competent court." 
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In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67 
S. Ct. 839, it was pointed out that though federal courts 
possessed the "inherent power" to dismiss an action on 
the basis of forum non conveniens, the doctrine actually 
had its origin in the state courts. In the cited case, the 
plaintiff below was a resident of Virginia where he operated 
a large public warehouse. The defendant was a Pennsylvania 
corporation, qualified to do business in both Virginia and 
New York, with a process agent in both states. Plaintiff 
brought a tort action in the federal court for the southern 
district of New York, alleging damages from a fire which 
burned his warehouse in Virginia. When sued in New 
York, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the 
grounds of forum non conveniens, claiming that the ap-
propriate place for trial was in Virginia, where the plain-
tiff resided and did ~usiness, where all the events in the 
litigation took place, where most of the witnesses lived, and 
where both state and federal courts were available. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower district 
court in granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the 
court possessed the inherent power to thus dismiss. In the 
course of its opinion, the Supreme Court stated: 
"We later expressly said that a state court 'may 
in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.' Broderick v. Rosner, 2,94 U. S. 629, 643, 
55 S. Ct. 589, 592, 79 L. Ed. 1100, 100 A. L. R. 1133; 
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 
294, n. 5, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 
1273. Even where federal rights binding on state 
courts under the Constitution are sought to be ad-
judged, this Court has sustained state courts in a 
refusal to entertain a litigation between a nonresi-
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dent and a foreign corporation or between two foreign 
corporations. Douglas v. New York N. H. & H. R. 
Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 7 4 7 ; Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No. 
1, 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225. 
" ... The defendant's consent to be sued [in a 
foreign jurisdiction] extends only to give the court 
jurisdiction of the person; it assumes that the court, 
having the parties before it, will apply all the ap-
plicable law, including, in those cases where it is 
appropriate, its discretionary judgment as to whether 
the suit should be entertained. In all cases in which 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into 
play, it presupposes at least two forums in which 
the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine 
furnishes criteria for choice between them." 
And in a footnote, to the above statement, the Court 
added that "The doctrine [of forum non conveniens] did not 
originate in federal but in state courts." See also Koster v. 
Lumbermen's 1Vlut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 6,7 S. Ct. 
828. And to the same effect is St. Louis & Iron Mountain 
Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 285, a case arising under the 
provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, in which 
the Court said : 
" ... Each state may, subject to the restrictions 
of the Federal Constitution, determine the limits of 
the jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the 
contro~ersies which shall be heard in them, and spec-
ifically how far it will, having jurisdiction of the 
parties, entertain in its courts transitory actions 
where the cause of action has arisen outside its bor-
ders." 
Subsequent to the Gulf Oil Corporation case, Congress 
enacted 28 U. S. C. Sec. 1404 (a), specifically authorizing 
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federal courts to apply the doctrine of forum non con,. 
veniens. But the decision in the Gulf Oil Corporation case 
and the other cases herein cited anticipated the federal 
statute. Section 1404 (a) is merely declaratory of the 
principle of "inherent power" which previously had been 
announced by the United States Supreme Court. Inter-
estingly enough, the House Report on the Bill to enact Sec. 
1404 (a), cited the holding of the Supreme Court in Balti-
more & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, supra, "as an example of the 
need of such a provision." See reviser's notes in House 
Report 308, 80th Congress. Since enactment of Section 
1404 (a), the Supreme Court has approved application of 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions in federal 
courts arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
Ex Parte Collett, - U. 8. -, 69 S. Ct. 944. 
It is to be noted that the Gulf Oil Corporation case in-
ferentially disposes of another of appellant's arguments, 
i. e., that because the respondent, a foreign corporation 
doing business in Utah, has appointed a process agent in 
Utah, it voluntarily has subjected itself to the jurisdiction 
of Utah Courts for the purpose of suit and cannot there-
after invoke the principle of forum non conveniens, citing 
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. 
S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153. But as pointed out by Mr. Justice 
Jackson, the defendant in the Gulf Oil Corporation case 
likewise was sued as a foreign corporation in a jurisdiction 
in which it maintained a process agent. There was no ques-
tion but that the court where suit was brought had the 
jurisdiction to entertain the litigation. However, as stated 
by the Supreme Court "that does not settle the question 
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whether it [the court where the action was initially brought] 
must do so. Indeed the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mis-
take of venue." It is clear, therefore, that the ruling of the 
Neirbo Co. case in no way qualifies application of forum 
non conveniens, since the doctrine "presupposes at least two 
forums in which the defendant is amenable to process" and 
"furnishes criteria for choice between them." 
Although some states have relied upon specific statutes 
as conferring the discretionary power to decline j urisdic-
tion upon the grounds of forum non conveniens (Loftus v. 
Penn. R. Co., supra, and Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. 
R. Co., supra,) many state courts have asserted the power 
as an inherent common law prerogative. Typical examples 
of the exercise of such power on an inherent basis and 
without benefit of statute are : 
Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 
281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152', 158; 
Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185', 79 N. E. (2d) 
593, cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 55 ; 
Thistle v. Halstead, 95 N. H. 87, 58 A. (2d) 503; 
Sielcken v. Sorenson, 111 N. J. E. 44, 161 A. 47. 
See also : Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law" 29 
Col. L. Rev. 1. 
In Universal £4djustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, supra, 
Chief Justice Rugg stated the doctrine in that state to be 
as follows: 
"The governing principle in such circumstances 
is that the parties have standing in the courts of this 
Commonwealth, not as a matter of strict right but 
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only as a matter of comity. Where it appears that com-
plete justice cannot be done here, that the defendant 
will be subjected to great and unnecessary inconven-
ience and expense, and that the trial will be attended, 
if conducted here, with many if not insuperable diffi-
culties whi~h all would be avoided without special 
hardship to the plaintiff if proceedings are brought 
in the jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled, 
where service can be had, where the cause of action 
arose and where justice can be done, our courts de-
cline to take jurisdiction on the general ground that 
the litigation may more appropriately be conducted 
in a foreign tribunal. Stated succinctly, the principle 
is that where in a broad sense the ends of justice 
strongly indicate that the controversy may be more 
suitably tried elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be 
declined and the parties relegated to relief to be 
sought in another forum. This is the doctrine of our 
own decisions. It prevails generally." [Italics added.] 
Likewise, in Whitney v. Madden, supra, the Illinois 
Supreme Court stated its rule of decision as follows: 
" ... the privilege of free access to the courts 
must be tempered with reasonable limitations ... 
"Many jurisdictions have added the limitation 
that if it is apparent that an appropriate forum is 
available and the relief is sought in the local courts 
by a nonresident against a nonresident for a transac-
tion which occurred outside the territorial boundaries 
of the State, for the purpose of frustrating the de-
fendant, or if the bringing of the action unduly bur-
dens the defendant or causes him great and unneces-
sary inconvenience, or unnecessarily burdens the 
court, the trial court may, in its discretion, decline 
the jurisdiction of the case, even though it may have 
proper jurisdiction over all parties and the subject 
matter involved. This is the doctrine of forum non 
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conveniens. The Federal courts have recognized the 
application of this doctrine and have found it not 
repugnant to section 2 of article IV, and section 1 of 
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the 
United States." 
In at least two recent cases, a state court on the basis 
of its inherent common law power has applied the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens in dismissing actions brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. These are: 
Hart v. Southern Pacific Company, (Superior 
Ct. of Cook County, Ill. No. 47 S. 96· 23,-
the opinion is set forth in the Appendix to 
this brief and a certified copy thereof has 
been filed with the Clerk of the Court.) 
Kelly v. Trustee, 1.11Jissouri Pacific Company, et 
al., (10 cases-Circuit Court, St. Clair 
County, IlL-the written order is set forth 
in the Appendix to this brief and a certified 
copy thereof has been filed with the Clerk 
of the Court.) · 
The opinion in Hart v. Southern Pacific Company, 
supra, contains a well reasoned discussion of the applicable 
cases, including the Douglas, Kepner, Miles and Gulf Oil 
cases. It fully sustains the respondent's position in the pre-
sent case. 
The cited state decisions all focus upon the point that 
in applying their inherent discretionary power to dismiss 
:, actions brought in an inconvenient forum, state courts 
r; should refuse to entertain jurisdiction when undue hard-
ship will be imposed upon one of the parties to the suit, 
and when it affirmatively appears that the convenience of 
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all concerned will be better served by trial in the forum 
where the alleged grievence occurred and most of the wit-
nesses reside. The principle becomes especially appropriate 
in suits between non-residents where a "shopping plaintiff" 
comes looking for the most suitable bargain counter. The 
manifest injustice of suits by plaintiffs looking for "soft 
spots" in the judicial system, and the unfair burden such 
suits impose upon defendants who are required to transport 
witnesses from other states to answer complaints brought in 
distant forums, to the detriment of the taxpayers and over-
crowded courts of the place chosen for such litigation, has 
been the subject of considerable comment by reviewers and 
students of our judicial system. The cited article in 44 Har-
vard Law Review 41 is an interesting example. The article 
contains the following pertinent comment with respect to the 
impact of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
in the Douglas case and its application to the decision in 
Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 230 N. W. 457, a 
case cited as authority by the appellant: 
"The most interesting question suggested by the 
Douglas case is what will happen in the states which 
have thus far felt a constitutional compulsion to en-
tertain vexatious suits by plaintiffs who are citizens 
of other states. Will they now feel free to treat ques-
tions as to the state of trial as sensibly as they do 
questions as to the county of trial, and will they re-
gard citizens of sister states as no more entitled to 
abuse their processes than aliens and foreign cor-
porations? This question was raised recently in Min-
nesota in the case of Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. 
R. R. The case was recognized as of great importance. 
Numerous counsel filed briefs as amici curiae-rep-
resentatives of railroads and, on the plaintiff's side, 
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counsel for labor unions and counsel whose interest 
is not stated of record. These last, one may infer, 
were interested as frequently appearing for non-resi-
dent plaintiffs in personal injury cases. The victory 
was for the personal injury racket-not, however, 
without a vigorous dissent. Thriving under a highly 
organized and thus far judicially tolerated system of 
ambulance chasing, and the old beliefs as to the effect 
of the privileges and immunities clause, the spectacle 
of vexatiously imported litigation has long been fa-
miliar in Minnesota. The majority opinion in the 
Boright case suggests that judges are perhaps becom-
ing callous to it. It seemed that the common law 
power to adapt procedure to prevent its abuse had 
atrophied. from disuse, and the court found on non- , 
constitutional grounds that it was powerless to dis-
miss such suits. Instead of regretting this situation, 
it glorified the Minnesota law for its hospitality to 
strangers, thus indicating that it was still thinking 
in terms of a philosophy which assimilates a would-
be litigant to a laborer or business man entitled to 
a free opportunity to try his luck in whatever state 
he chooses. Compelled by the United States Supreme 
Court to abandon any constitutional sanction for this 
theory, the majority of the Court still stubbornly ad-
heres to it as determining at least the domestic pol-
icy of the state. The decision is hardly one to com-
mend itself for general acceptance." 
So far as the state courts of Utah are concerned, they 
are in the same position as the courts of Massachusetts and 
Illinois, in that no state statute expressly confers the power 
to decline jurisdiction of an action on the basis of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. But this, of course, is im-
material if the discretionary authority is vested in the state 
courts as part of their inherent power under common law 
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precedent. In his article in 44 Harvard Law Review 41, 52, 
Foster points out that it is far more desirable for state 
courts to assert their inherent common law powers in this 
respect than to wait for possibly unwieldy legislation on the 
subject. The article continues: 
"The best hope is that courts will feel free to 
take appropriate action without specific legislation 
authorizing them to do so. It is submitted that au-
thority for such action is implicit in well-established 
common law principles. The closest analogy is to 
change of venue on terms for the convenience of wit-
nesses ... " 
Again, in 29, Columbia Law Review 1, Mr. Paxton Blair 
stated the common law power of state courts in this respect, 
as follows: 
"At the outset it is to be noted that new legis-
lation is not needed before any benefit can be ex-
pected to flow from the remedies we propose ; for the 
doctrine in question [forum non conveniens] involves 
nothing more than an appeal to the inherent power 
possessed by any court of justice-powers, that is to 
say, which are incontestibly necessary to the effec-
tive performance of judicial functions." 
Though no Utah statute in specific terms confers the 
power to dismiss an action upon the basis of forum non 
conveniens, the State Code (88-2-1) does contain the fol-
lowing reference to the inherent common law powers of the 
state courts : 
"The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the constitution or the 
I 
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laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tions of this state and the necessities of the people 
thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state." 
As heretofore pointed out, the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens was and is a firmly established principle of the 
common law of England. By virtue of the foregoing statute, 
this common law principle is incorporated in and made a part 
of the local law of this state. As heirs of the English com.,. 
mon law, the state courts of Utah not only have the inherent 
power to invoke the principle, but also the general statutory 
authorization. This necessarily follows, unless it can be 
said that the principle of forum non conveniens is repug-
nant to the state laws or inconsistent with the natural and 
physical conditions of the state. But far from being repug-
nant to or inconsistent with state law, the principle is prac-
tically identical with the announced statutory policy of the 
Utah courts to order a change of venue within the state 
"when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice 
would be promoted by the change." Utah Code Anno. (1943), 
104-4-9 (3). Certainly, there is nothing in the State Con-
stitution or statutes of Utah, which in a way impinges upon 
this common law principle. Provisions to the effect that 
state "courts shall be open" and that transitory actions 
.. · "shall be brought and tried" in certain counti~s, contain no 
suggestion that a state court may not in an appropriate 
case decline to exercise jurisdiction in order to facilitate 
justice and prevent undue hardship. Moreover, the state 
;.:: courts of Utah have original and plenary authority, Art. 
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VIII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah, and by statute are given 
broad discretion to adopt appropriate procedures to carry 
their power into effect. Utah Code Anno. (1943), 20-7-3 (8), 
(9). The doctrine of forum non conveniens "assumes that 
the court, having the parties before it, will apply all the 
applicable law, including in those cases where it is appropri-
ate its discretionary judgment as to whether the suit should 
be entertained." 330 U. S. 506, 67 S. Ct. 842. 
This Court has recognized by its prior ruling that the 
state courts of Utah do possess the inherent power to dis-
miss an action upon the basis of forum non conveniens. 
Essentially the same propositions involved in the present 
case were argued at some length to the Court on petitions 
for alternative writ of prohibition in cases No. 7326, No. 
732~7, and No. 7328 entitled The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, a corporation, Plaintiff, v. 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the Judges 
thereof, Defendants. In the cited cases, this Court by written 
order denied alternative writs of prohibition for the stated 
reason that it was "not made to appear that there was a 
clear duty on the part of the District Court to grant the 
motion to dismiss." The order further stated that "denial 
of this writ is not intended to suggest what the court might 
hold in a proceeding seeking to set aside or review an order 
of the District Court dismissing a cause of action for reasons 
of forum non conveniens." It is apparent from the terms of 
the foregoing order that although the Court recognized the 
existence of the inherent power of dismissal in the trial 
court, it declined to interfere with the exercise of that 
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power upon the plea that there had been an arbitrary abuse 
of discretion on the facts of the particular case. But in order 
to reach the issue of discretion, the Court necessarily held 
that the trial court had the inherent power in a proper case 
to dismiss for reasons of forum non conveniens. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens is a part of the law of this state, 
both on the basis of inheritance from the English common 
law and on the basis of the previous ruling of this Court. 
It is as much a part of the law of this state as any state 
statute. It is a necessary part of the inherent right and 
power of the state courts in order to control their own pro-
cedure, effect the orderly administration of their affairs, 
and "promote the ends of justice." 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED A PROPER DISCRE-
TION IN DISMISSING, WITHOUT PR.E-JUDICE, 
THE PRESENT ACTION. 
The various factors to be given consideration by a trial 
court in connection with a motion to dismiss on the grounds 
of forum non conveniens were stated by Mr. Justice Jack-
son in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra, as follows: 
"If the combination and weight of factors re-
quisite to given results are difficult to forecast or 
state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. 
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be 
most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. 
Important considerations are the relative ease of 
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access to sources of proof ; availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibil-
ity of view of premises, if view would be appropriate 
to the action; and all other practical problems that 
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive. There may also be questions as to the enforci-
bility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will 
weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. 
It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice 
of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' 
the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or 
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his 
remedy. * * * 
"Factors of public interest also have place in 
applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties 
follow for courts when litigation is piled up in con-
gested centers instead of being handled at its origin. 
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed 
upon the people of a community which has no rela-
tion to the litigation. In cases which touch the af-
fairs of many persons, there is reason for holding 
the trial in their view and reach rather than in re-
mote parts of the country where they can learn of 
it by report only. There is a local interest in having 
localized controversies decided at home." 
Again in Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 Ohio St. 
325, 140 N. E. 94, 99, in discussing the reasons why an 
F. E. L. A. action arising in Pennsylvania and brought in 
Ohio against a Pennsylvania corporation was dismissed 
on the basis of forum non conveniens, the Court said: 
" ... It has not been made to appear that this 
plaintiff has been denied access to the courts of Penn-
sylvania, or that in any manner substantial preju-
dice results to him by the Ohio courts having sus-
in 
ili 
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tained the motion to quash. Again it is difficult to 
see how he can be prejudiced by being required to 
litigate his cause at the place of his residence, or at 
the place of his injury, in the State of Pennsylvania, 
where no doubt his witnesses reside, and where his 
litigation can be prosecuted at much less expense 
than in the distant jurisdiction of the State of Ohio. 
* * * [It] might very pertinently be remarked 
at this point that the courts of our state are main-
tained at considerable expense, and only a small frac-
tion of such expense is charged to litigants, the major 
portion being met by taxes and levied upon the prop-
erty of the state. The constitutional mandate that 
all courts shall be open does not require that the 
burdens of taxation in a single state shall be further 
increased to provide remedies by judicial process for 
those who for reasons of their own prefer to reside 
in other states." 
The foregoing quotations make clear the criteria for 
application of the principle of forum non conveniens. All 
of these factors affirmatively were shown to exist in the 
case at bar. The alleged cause of action arose in another 
state, some distance from the forum. Both parties to the 
suit were non-residents, the plaintiff being a resident of 
Denver, Colorado, and the defendant being a foreign corpora-
tion with its general offices and headquarters located in 
Denver, Colorado. As shown at the hearing on the defend-
ant's motion in the court below, all of the witnesses neces-
sary for a fair trial of the case resided within convenient 
distance to Denver, Colorado, including the plaintiff, 
himself. The relative superiority of Denver as com-
pared to Salt Lake City, with respect to ease of access to 
sources of proof can not be questioned. Moreover, it was 
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shown that if trial took place in Salt Lake City, the defend-
ant would be seriously handicapped by the lack of compulsory 
process to secure the attendance of necessary witnesses, 
and that the cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses 
in any event would be excessive and burdensome. More-
over, many factors of public interest in the present case 
tended to make trial in Salt Lake City inconvenient and 
vexatious. The trial court took notice of the congested 
condition of the court calendar in Salt Lake County, and 
the delay that this and similar type cases imposed upon 
local litigation. Other factors which the trial court weighed 
consisted of the burden of jury duty on local citizens in 
cases imported from another state, and the expense of 
maintaining local courts in order to provide a forum for 
foreign controversies. Also, it was made to appear without 
contradiction, that trial of the present case in the courts 
of Colorado could be had without prejudice to the rights of 
the plaintiff and with much greater convenience to all con-
cerned. 
In view of all these considerations, the trial court's 
exercise of discretionary authority in declining to assume 
jurisdiction of this case cannot be seriously questioned. For 
the trial court to have acted otherwise would have consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion. The record demonstrates 
that the trial court's ruling was based upon considered 
judgment and unrefuted facts. The discretion exercised 
clearly was dictated by considerations of fair play and even-
handed justice. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the venue privilege 
as contained in Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act does not require state courts to entertain actions 
under the Act. The venue of such actions in state courts 
is left to the local state law. For the Act "does not impose 
a duty upon state courts as against a valid excuse, but 
rather confers a power." Moreover, the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court have established that a state 
court may exercise its discretionary authority to dismiss 
an action brought by a non-resident against a foreign corp-
oration doing business within the forum, without violating 
any provision of the Federal Constitution. 
By virtue of its heritage of the principles of the com-
mon law of England, the state courts of Utah have the in-
herent power to dismiss an action upon the basis of forum 
non conveniens. The assertion of this discretion by the 
state courts is fully sustained by authority and precedent. 
It is a necessary power of the state courts in order to con-
trol their own procedure and "to promote the ends of jus-
tice." In the present action between a non-resident plain-
tiff and a foreign corporation on a cause of action arising 
in another state, there was an affirmative showing in the 
trial court of serious inconvenience and hardship to the de-
fendant if trial were permitted in the courts of Salt Lake 
County instead of the courts of Colorado, where the plain-
tiff and all the necessary witnesses resided. It further was 
shown that the costs of trial in Salt Lake County would be 
vexatious and burdensome to the defendant, and that trial 
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of the case in Salt Lake County would add to the congestion 
of a badly crowded court calendar. In consideration of all 
these factors, the trial court exercised a proper discretion 
in dismissing, without prejudice, the plaintiff's complaint, 
in order that the action might be initiated in a more con-
venient forum. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
COR.NW ALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 13751; Cloyd Pottorff vs. 
Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., No. 
12317; Leroy C. Bair vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 10848; 
Harry Carter v. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 11003, the 
defendant's joint and several motions to dismiss, etc., are 
and the same are hereby denied. 
(b) That in the cases of Sherman Garrison vs. Thomp-
son, Trustee, etc., No. 14343; Preston Garrison vs. Thomp-
son, Trustee, etc., No. 14342; James A. Jones vs. Thomp-
son, Trustee, etc., No. 13383; Arnie C. Green v. Thompson, 
Trustee, etc., No. 13521; defendant is hereby given leave to 
withdraw his answer, and the Court, on consideration of his 
several motions to dismiss, does order that plaintiffs' several 
complaints be, and the same are, hereby dismissed without 
prejudice to each plaintiff to reb ring his action elsewhere. 
Enter: 
/a/ RALPH L. MAXWELL, 
Circuit J udg'e. 
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STATE OF ILLINOIS } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF COOK 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COOK COUNTY 
W. J. HART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. No. 47 S 9623 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
DefendJant. 
OPINION OF THE COURT UPON THE MOTION OF 
THE DEFENDANT TO DISMISS THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This action is brought under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act to recover damas-es for personal injuries al-
leged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on July 2, 
1946, at Albany, Oregon, while in defendant's employ as 
a switchman. The plaintiff resides at Albany, Oregon. The 
defendant is incorporated under the laws of Kentucky. It 
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operates railroad lines as a common carrier in the states of 
Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, California, Nevada and 
Oregon arid not elsewhere. Defendant does not operate any 
railroad nor own or maintain any tracks within 1000 miles 
of Illinois. It does, however, maintain an office in Chicago 
for soliciting freight and passenger business and is, for 
purposes of venue, doing business in the State of Illinois. 
The defendant filed a written motion to dismiss the 
case under the principle of forum non conveniens. In sup-
port of this motion] affidavits were filed by the defendant 
alleging substantially the following: That the defendant is 
not an Illinois corporation; does not operate a railroad line 
into Illinois ; does not own or maintain any tracks within 
Illinois ; is not licensed to do business in Illinois; that the 
injuries complained of by the plaintiff occurred in Albany, 
Oregon, the place of residence of the plaintiff. 
The affidavits further set forth that 14 witnesses neces-
sary for the defense of the cause of action reside in Albany, 
Oregon, or substantially in that vicinity, a distance from 
Chicago by rail of approximately 2300 miles; that two 
physicians residing at or near Albany, Oregon, will be re-
quired to attend the trial in Chicago; that at least five (5) 
days of actual trial will be required to complete the testi-
mony in this case, that all of the defendant's witnesses will 
have to be transported to Chicago and housed and fed here at 
the defendant's expense; that traveling time for each of the~e 
witnesses by rail will require additional three days in each 
direction; that the witnesses are employed by the railroad 
and that their absence for a period of approximately eleven 
r,l 
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days would impede the railroad service; that the defendant 
would be required to pay for the time of these witnesses dur-
ing their absence; that its expenditure for such purposes 
would approximate the sum of Thirty Seven Hundred Dol-
lars ( $3700.00) . 
The affidavits further recite that there is functioning 
in the State of Oregon regularly constituted state and fed-
eral courts available to the plaintiff for the adjudication of 
his claim. That a case now filed in the local courts of Oregon 
could be reached for trial within five months. 
The affidavits further set forth that during the period 
from July 2, 1945 to April 12, 1946, a single attorney filed 
thirty-four cases under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act in the Superior Court of Cook County against the same 
defendant, arising out of accidents which occurred in Cali-
fornia, Arizona, New Mexico ~nd Oregon. That in the five-
year period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1946, more than 
669, of such cases were commenced in the courts of Cook 
County, Illinois, and notices of 546 additional claims were 
filed under the Federal Employers Liability Act by plain-
tiffs, none of them residents of Illinois; that one of the at-
torneys for the plaintiff (now deceased) participated in 
114 of these cases; that the aggregate of such cases filed 
and claims which might result into actions in this county 
imported into Chicago between 1941 and 1946 total 1215, 
an average rate of 308 cases and 316 claims per year, and 
that the percentage of increase is constantly mounting. 
The affidavits further set forth that these transitory 
cases clog the jury calendars of our courts and constitute a 
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financial burden on this county and state, and that the 
jury calendar of common law cases is now three years 
behind. 
A counter affidavit was filed in behalf of the plaintiff 
to the effect that the above case was filed in the Superior 
Court of Cook County not for the purpose of harassing the 
defendant, but because it was the plaintiff's belief that he 
could secure a larger and more substantial verdict against 
the defendant in this jurisdiction than in his own immedi-
ate locality; that Illinois citizens from time to time filed 
cases on transitory torts in other states, and that the ap-
plication of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would 
warrant other courts from excluding cases of Illinois resi-
dents. 
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
There is no doubt that this court has jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and of the parties. It is conceded that gen-
erally the principle of forum non conveniens is recognized 
in the State of Illinois. The sole issue is whether or not the 
Illinois courts may invoke this principle to appropriate cases 
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The 
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may, 
because of considerations of convenience to the parties or 
to the court, refuse to hear a case even though it is other-
wise properly before the court. 
Section 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act ( 45 
U. S. C. A. Section 56) contains the following relevant 
provision: 
l.ai 
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"Under this chapter an action may be brought 
in a district court of the United States, in the district 
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the 
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall 
be doing business at the time of commencing such 
action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States under this chapter shall be concurrent with 
that of the courts of the several States, and no case 
arising under this chapter and brought in any State 
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to 
any court of the United States." 
The plaintiff maintains that the above provision which 
conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the State courts 
made it mandatory upon a state court to exercise its juris-
diction in all cases brought under this Act. He maintains 
that the principle of forum non conveniens is not applica-
able to cases under Federal Employers Liability Act and 
cites authorities to support this view. 
The defendant contends that the grant of jurisdiction 
to state courts under the Employers Liability Act only im-
poses on state courts a duty to act in conformity with local 
laws and general principles of practice and procedure pre-
vailing in that court; that Congress did not attempt to com-
pel the exercise of jurisdiction by a state court if such 
jurisdiction in other similar cases is discretionary. 
CONSIDERATION OF AUTHORITIES 
The general principle of forum non conveniens has 
been approved by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the most 
recent case of Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, in which 
the court says : 
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"* * * if it is apparent that an appropriate 
forum is available and the relief is sought in the local 
courts by a non-resident against a non-resident for a 
transaction which occurred outside the territorial 
boundaries of the State, for the purpose of frustrat-
ing the defendant, or if the bringing of the action fJ 
unduly burdens the defendant or cause him great and 
unnecessary inconvenience, or unnecessarily burdens 
the court, the trial court may, in its discretion, de-
cline the jurisdiction of the case, even though it may 
have proper jurisdiction over all parties and the sub-
ject matter involved. This is the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. The Federal courts have recognized 
the application of this doctrine and have found it not 
repugnant to section 2 of article IV, and section 1 
of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States." 
Although the above case does not involve an action under 
the Federal Employers Liability Act, it does establish the 
principle that local courts may refuse to entertain jurisdic-
tion of a case because of inconvenience to the parties or the 
court. The Federal courts have also consistently recognized 
and applied the principle of forum non conveniens. Kostner 
v. Lumbermen's Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518; Gulf Oil Corpora,. 
tion v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501. 
The sole question presented by the motion to dismiss, 
is whether or not the principle of forum non conveniens is 
applicable to cases arising under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act. 
The plaintiff relies principally upon the language of the 
following cases of the United States Supreme Court: B. & 
0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44; Miles v. Illinois Central 
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Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 
330 U. S. 501. In each of the above cases the majority 
opinion stated categorically that the principle of forum 
non conveniens is not applicable to cases arising under the 
Federal Employers Liability Act. An analysis of these cases, 
however, will demonstrate that these categorical statements 
were merely dicta and that the principle of forum non 
conveniens was not directly involved. 
The Kepner case involved an attempt by a state court 
of Ohio to enjoin the prosecution of a case under the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act which had been filed in the 
Federal District Court of New York. The United States 
Supreme Court was at first evenly divided, but upon re-
hearing rendered a decision by a divided court to the effect 
that a state court could not enjoin its citizens from seeking 
access to a foreign forum of their choice. The right of the 
federal district court of New York to refuse to take juris-
diction of this case because of inconvenience either to the 
parties or to the court was not in issue. Hence, the b:road 
statement in the majority opinion that the principle of 
forum non conveniens is not applicable to cases under the 
Federal Employers Liability Act is mere dictum. 
The Miles case involved the power of one state to enjoin 
its citizens from seeking access to a forum in another state. 
A suit was filed in a Tennessee court for injunction to re-
strain a Tennessee citizen from prosecuting an action 
brought in Missouri under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act. The holding of the United States Supreme Court by 
a vote of 5 to 4, was that the Tennessee court could not en-
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join its citizens from seeking access to the Missouri court 
on the ground of inconvenience to the defendant. The Miles 
case did not involve the right of the Missouri court to de-
cline to hear this case because of inconvenience to the parties 
or to the court. In fact, the opinion in the Miles case recogn-
ized the power of a state to regulate by judicial decision 
the use of its courts by applying the principle of forum non 
conveniens (315 U. S. 704) : 
"This is not to say that states cannot control 
their courts. We do not deal here with the power of 
Missouri by judicial decision or legislative enactment 
to regulate the use of its courts generally, as was ap-
proved in the Douglas or the Chambers cases, supra, 
note 6. We are considering another state's power to 
so control its own citizens that they cannot exercise 
the federal privilege of litigating a federal right in 
the court of another state." 
Obviously the Miles case is no authority for the propo-
sition that the principle of forum non conveniens is not 
applicable to cases arising under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act. 
The Gulf Oil case did not involve an action under the 
Federal Employers Liability Act. The issue in that case 
was whether or not a United States District Court had the 
inherent power to apply the principle of forum non con-
veniens to dismiss a case based on an ordinary tort brought 
in a District Court of New York against a foreign corpora-
tion to recover damages sustained in Virginia. In a 5 to 4 
decision, Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority of the 
court did say gratuitously, "It is true that in cases under 
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the Federal Employers Liability Act, we have held a plain-
tiff's choice of a forum cannot be denied on the basis of 
forum non conveniens.'' (Citing the Miles and the Kepner 
cases.) The discretionary power of a state court to apply 
the principle of forum non conveniens to Federal Employers 
Liability Act cases was obviously not involved. 
The other cases cited by the plaintiff in his brief are 
similarly distinguishable. The only case which appears to 
support plaintiff's position is Leet v. Union Pacific, 155 
Pac. (2d) 42 (California). In that case the plaintiff, as 
administrator appointed by the California court and a resi-
dent of California, sued in a California state court for dam-
ages arising out of an accident in Oregon. The California 
court held that forum non conveniens is not applicable to 
cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act, cit-
ing the Miles and Kepner cases. However, the plaintiff, a 
resident of the State of California, was appointed adminis-
trator by the Probate ·Court of California and could not sue in 
that capacity in any other state. As the court pointed out in 
its opinion, it would be anomalous to appoint Leet as adminis-
trator for the purpose of suing in California and then deny 
him the right to sue by reasons of inconvenience. 
On the other hand, many of the decisions cited by 
plaintiff contain language to the effect that the jurisdiction 
of state courts in cases under the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act are subject to local laws and procedure. 
The phrase "as prescribed by local laws is adequate 
for the occasion" or "according to the rules of procedure 
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prevailing in that court" seems to be a uniform limitation 
in the cases cited by the plaintiff. 
The United States Supreme Court as well as state 
courts have recognized these limitations. 
In the Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 
the court said (page 56-57) : 
"* * * we deem it well to observe that there 
is not here involved any attempt by Congress toe~­
large or regulate the jurisdiction of State courts or to 
control or affect their modes of procedure, but only 
a question of the duty of such a court, when its or-
dinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is ap-
propriate to the occasion and is invoked in conform-
ity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action 
to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the 
act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication ac-
cording to the prevailing rules of procedure." (Em-
phasis mine.) 
To the same effect seeM cKnett vs. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 
292 U. S. 230; Minn. & St. L. R. R. vs. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 
211, 218. 
The case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 
279 U. S. 385, involved a suit in New York under the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act by a resident of Connecticut 
for injuries sustained in Connecticut against the defendant 
railroad, a Connecticut corporation doing business in New 
York. A New York statute limited actions against foreign 
corporations by non-residents to foreign corporations doing 
business within the State. It was contended that the juris-
diction upon state courts is imposed by the Employers Liabil-
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ity Act. Justice Holmes, speaking for a majority of the 
court, said: 
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employ-
ers' Liability Act, that statute does not purport to 
require state courts to entertain suits arising under 
it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the 
authority of the United States is concerned. It may 
very well be that if the Supreme Court of New York 
were given no discretion, being otherwise competent, 
it would be subject to a duty. But there is nothing 
in the act of Congress that purports to force a duty 
upon such courts as against an otherwise valid ex-
cuse." 
Murnan v. Wabash Railroad, 246 New York 244, in-
volved an action begun in New York state court by a resi-
dent of Connecticut under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act for an accident which occurred in Michigan on the de-
fendant's railroad. The trial court dismissed the case under 
the principle of forum non conveniens. The New York 
Court of Appeals said : 
"There is not here involved any attempt by Con-
gress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of State 
courts· or to control or affect the modes of procedure, 
but only a question of the duty of such a court, when 
its ordi'YUlry jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws 
is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in con-
formity with those laws, to take cognizance of an 
action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising 
under the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudi-
cation according to the prevailing rules of procedure 
* * *" 
"That Congress has undertaken to regulate the 
exercise of jurisdiction by our courts by making com-
pulsory what in similar cases is discretionary seems 
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an unreasonable conclusion and a resulting invasion 
of the powers of our tribunals as heretofore exercised. 
We conclude that a litigant who brings his action 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act stands 
before the court in no different attitude than a liti-
gant who brings his action under the statute of a sis-
ter state. He may not be cast out because he is suing 
under the Act of Congress. He may not enforce his 
rights merely because he is suing under the act." 
(Emphasis mine.) 
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal 
Employers Liability Act did not compel state courts to 
handle all cases falling under the provisions of that Act. 
In Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, our own Supreme Court 
said: 
"In view of the powers of the Federal govern-
ment and the States and in the light of the uniform 
decisions relating to the subject, this provision (Sec. 
6 of the Federal Act) can only mean that when the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a State as fixed by local 
laws empowers them to hear and determine a certain 
class of actions, an action of that class arising under 
Federal law may be enforced as of right in the S,tate 
court." (Emphasis mine.) 
In a more recent case under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (Taylor v. Southern Railway Company, 350 
Ill. 139) our Supreme Court said : 
"If he elects to bring his suit in a State court 
the act having made no regulation of the practice 
and procedure in those I actions, the practice and pro-
cedure are regulated by the law of the forum. The 
act contemplated suits in State courts and accepted 
State procedure in advance. (Minneapolis and St. 
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local litigants and witnesses are interested. That such a 
trial costs the taxpayers of St. Clair County in jury fees, 
court's and court attache's time approximately $600.00 to 
$900.00. 
10. That while Section 6 of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act confers jurisdiction upon this court to try 
these cases, it is not mandatory upon the Court to accept that 
jurisdiction. That it is within the inherent power of this 
Court in its discretion to decline jurisdiction of litigation 
between two non-residents when its acceptance will and does 
interfere with its own orderly and efficient administration 
of justice, unnecessarily burdens the Court, and when such 
litigation can be conducted in an available forum in the 
State of plaintiff's residence or in a State where the accident 
occurred, which is more conveniently located for the parties, 
and where the elements of undue cost, vexation, frustration 
and harassment to the parties do not exist. 
11. That each case here sought to be dismissed, as 
well as any other case similarly brought in which a dis-
missal on similar grounds is prayed, must be considered 
on its own particular merits. In several of the cases em-
braced by this motion, the defendant has taken plaintiff's 
deposition, while in others, the .Statute of Limitations has 
either run or about to expire. In such cases the allowance 
of the motion would materially prejudice the plaintiff's 
rights. 
IT IS, THERE-FORE, ORDERED: 
(a) That in the cases of Alee Richardson vs. Thomp-
son, Trustee, etc., No. 12283; Raymond E. Lipscomb vs. 
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cently passed and became effective September 1, 1948. It 
provides as follows : 
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a District Court may trans-
fer any civil action to any other District or Division 
where it might have been brought." (Title 28, U.S. 
Code, Section 1404(a) .) 
The contention of the plaintiff that this statute is not 
applicable to cases under Federal Employers Liability Act 
does not lend itself to reason in view of the reference of the 
statute to "any civil action." This statute is an express 
recognition of the principle of forum non conveniens in 
the Federal courts. It is difficult to perceive any sound 
reason why the Federal courts should enjoy the prerogative 
of refusing to hear cases because of inconvenience whpe the 
same privilege is denied to state courts. It is true that in 
the Federal courts only a transfer to another district is 
required while in the state courts a dismissal and the refiling 
in another jurisdiction is necessary. Yet, that distinction 
is more perfunctory than real. In the light of this new 
statute, it would appear that the concurrent jurisdiction of 
state courts should also be subject to the privilege of re-
fusing jurisdiction because of inconvenience. 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of forum non conveniens lies in the sound 
discretion of the court. It should be applied with great 
caution and reserve. Serious consideration should be given 
to the intent of Congress. to provide a forum for cases under 
the Federal Employers Liability Act beyond the locale of 
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the accident if desired. Persons injured in employment 
should have the opportunity of seeking a forum away from 
local influences and other disadvantages. Only in extreme 
cases of inconvenience should a court refuse to take juris-
diction. 
Such an extreme situation is presented by this case. 
The unusual factual situation in this case justifies this 
court to invoke the principle of forum non conveniens. The 
defendant has no railroad line into Illinois, but only main-
tains an office for solicitation of business. It is neither 
incorporated in Illinois nor authorized to do business under 
our statutes. The witnesses for both plaintiff and defend-
ant reside at a distance of about 2300 miles from this juris-
diction. Plaintiff lives in Oregon. The accident occurred in 
Oregon, in a locale not familiar to our local courts and juries. 
Fourteen witnesses, including two physicians, will have to 
be transported, housed and fed by the defendants for about 
two weeks at an expense of about $3700.00, not recoverable 
as costs in the event of a victory by the defe~dant. 'These 
witnesses will be separated from their customary jobs and 
professions. 
This case is not an occasional instance of a migratory 
suit coming into our jurisdiction. The affidavits on file in 
this cause set forth that cases of this migratory character 
now pending in this jurisdiction represent a large percent-
age of all cases pending in the local courts; that the number 
is constantly increasing. The influx of these cases into this 
jurisdiction is not a mere accident. It commenced in 1941 
when an enterprising group of lawyers saw the possibility 
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of personal profits from the importation of these cases to 
this jurisdiction. These cases have been clogging our court 
calendars and materially interefere and delay the progress 
of other cases in our courts. Citizens of Illinois, many of 
them working people, who sustained serious injuries are 
obliged to wait as much as three and four years to have 
their rights adjudicated. The influx of these migratory 
cases in such large numbers is a grave injustice to these 
people. 
This court will take judicial notiee that the trial of each 
of these migratory cases involves a cost to our taxpayers 
of over $1,000 per case, based on an average of a five-day 
jury trial; the salary of a presiding judge for such period 
is approximately $350.00; the jury fees approximately 
$300.00; and, in addition thereto, the salaries of clerks, 
bailiffs, cost of heat, light and other services certainly ag-
gregate an amount in excess of $1,000 per case. Upon that 
basis the taxpayers of Illinois will be burdened by an ex-
pense of about one and a half million dollars in connection 
with these cases, whereas the filing fee is only $23.00 per 
case. It does not appear to be reasonable that Congress 
intended unqualifiedly to impose such a burden on these 
defendants and on state courts. 
It is inconceivable that under such extreme circum-
stances a state court is powerless to protect itself against 
the flagrant abuse of comity. This case must be considered 
in the light of its own particular circumstance and in light of 
the general situation prevailing in this jurisdiction. All 
these factors lead me to the conclusion that the principle of 
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forum non conveniens should be applied to this case. Ac-
cordingly, on the basis of the principle of forum non con-
veniens, the motion to dismiss this case will be allowed, 
and the cause is hereby dismissed. 
(Signed) SAMUEL B. EPSTEIN, 
Judge. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
WILLIAM J. KELLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ALEE RICHARDSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Deferulmnt. 
SHERMAN GARR:ISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 13578 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 1226,3 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 14343 
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PRES·TON GARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. ·THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
JAMES A. JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendhnt. 
RAYMOND E. LIPSCOMB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ARNIE C. GREEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CLOYD POTTORFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 14342 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 13383 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 13751 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 13521 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 12317 
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Loois Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211; Louw~ 
ville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Stew·art, 241 id. 
261.) But the act of Congress does not attempt to en-
large or regulate the jurisdiction of State courts or 
to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only 
imposes on such a court the duty, when its ordinary 
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropri· 
ate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with 
those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce 
a right of civil recovery arising under the act and 
susceptible of adjudication according to the prevail-
ing rules of procedure. Minneapolis and St. Louis 
Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, supra." 
Plaintiff admits that this court would have the right 
to deny jurisdiction of this case if the Illinois statute gave 
it such right. He distinguishes the case of Walton v. Pryor, 
supra, on the ground that an Illinois statute prohibited 
actions in this state for wrongful death occurring outside 
of the State of Illinois. He also attempts to distinguish 
the case of Murnan v. Wabash Railway Company as well as 
the Douglas v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. on the ground of 
existing statutes. If the jurisdiction of a state court in 
cases arising under the Federal Liability Act can be limited 
by statute, there seems to be no logical reason why limita-
tions under common law may not also be enforced. If the 
principle of forum non conveniens is an established rule of 
administration of justice in a state, it is immaterial whether 
it has been established by judicial decision or legislative 
enactment. 
As further proof that the convenience of the parties 
and of the court is gaining favor, a Federal statute was re-
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HARRY L. CARTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation; 
Defendant. 
LEROY C. BAIRD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
DefendJant. 
ORDER 
xix 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 11003 
CIVIL ACTION 
AT LAW 
NO. 10848 
A joint and several verified motion to dismiss was here 
filed by the same defendant to apply in each of the above 
styled cases. Leave to withdraw each of the defendants' 
answers was sought and alternative relief to dismissal such 
as a general continuance or 3: transfer of venue in each case 
to adjoining counties of the State where trials could be 
had without undue interference with the administration of 
justice was also requested in such motion. 
The said joint and several motion was argued by coun-
sel for both parties on September 24, 1948, and briefs re-
quested. 
(1) However, on the 5th day of October, 1948, be-
cause the parties had taken depositions in the case of Kelly 
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v. Thompson, etc., No. 13578, and the same had previously 
been set for trial, this Court denied the motion as to said 
cause, and ordered that it be tried, but in said order did 
save and reserve its decision on said motion as to the re-
maining cases. 
(2) Now on this 27th day of January, 1949, all 
briefs having been furnished, and the Court, after having 
been properly advised in the premises, and after having 
made personal investigation and observations as to the con-
dition of the law, chancery and criminal dockets and the 
administration of the judicial business of the St. Clair 
·County Circuit Court, finds: 
1. 'That in each of the cases sought to be dismissed, 
the plaintiff brought his suit for damages under the pro-
visions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act for in-
juries sustained while in the employ of the defendant. 
2. That the defendant in each case is Guy A. Thomp-
son, Trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a 
citizen and resident of Missouri, and in his capacity as 
Trustee operates a railroad in Illinois and Missouri, and 
other states in the South and Southwest. 
3. That each plaintiff is represented by a lawyer with 
offices in Chicago, Illinois, but that in each case he associ-
ates with him a St. Clair County, Illinois lawyer on a per 
diem basis. 
4. That the residence and place of accident of each 
plaintiff and the distance from the County Seat of St. Clair 
County, Illinois, is as follows : 
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Mileage from 
Place of Belleville, 
No. of Case Pl. Residence Accident Ill. 
12263 Little Rock, Ark. Same 300 
14343 Kansas City, Mo. Same 300 
14342 Little Rock, Ark. Same 300 
13751 Little Rock, Ark. Same 300 
11003 Kansas City, :Mo. Same 300 
13383 Fort Smith, Ark. Same 375 
13521 Hope, Ark. Same 470 
12317 Osawatomie, Kans. Same '450 
13751 Little Rock, Ark. Same 300 
5. That there are no witnesses, parties, citizens, resi-
dents or taxpayers residing in St. Clair County, Illinois, 
who have a real or material interest or who are involved in 
any of the suits sought to be dismissed. 
6. That in each case the additional cost to the defend-
ant to try a case of this character in St. Clair County, Illinois, 
over a County in the State where the accident occurred or 
where the plaintiff resides will approximate Five Hundred 
Dollars; that defendant, as well as the plaintiff, is at a dis-
advantage in trying a case in a foreign jurisdiction because 
of the inability to compel unwilling witnesses to attend trial 
and the unsatisfactory use of depositions at a trial. That 
the additional cost to the plaintiff, and the difficulties which 
sometimes beset him in a foreign jurisdiction often times 
exceed any alleged advantages he purportedly receives in 
choosing a forum so far from home, making the supposed 
alluring advantage to him more illusory than real. 
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7. That the St. Clair County Circuit Court is believed 
to have the heaviest criminal, civil and chancery docket of 
any County of the State, save Cook County. That the docket 
has increased by sixty per cent over a comparable period 
prior to the war. That a single presiding judge (the three 
circuit Judges of this district alternating) did, during 
1947 and 1948, dispose of cases as follows: 858 Law (jury 
and non-jury), 982 chancery, 506 criminal, 170 habeas 
corpus, 360 motions, decree modifications, citations, etc., and 
210 probation hearings. That from January 1, 1948, to 
September 21, 1948, 1025 new law chancery and criminal 
cases were filed. That on the last mentioned date there were 
on file and undisposed of 1334 cases, some of which cases 
where jury trials were requested were on file more than 
eighteen months. That in a large majority of said pending 
cases St. Clair County was and is the only county of venue 
and the witnesses and parties are residents and taxpayers 
of the County. 
8. That for the past year St. Clair County has been 
in a critical financial plight. That jurors are now being paid 
by vouchers due, but not necessarily payable, in December, 
1949. 
9. That many cases similar to those here sought to be 
dismissed have in the past three years been brought in the 
St. Clair County Circuit Court by the present counsel for 
the respective plaintiffs. That the usual time required for 
trial of such a case is two to four court days. That such 
trial results in no benefit to any resident or taxpayer of St. 
Clair County, but instead, because of the congestion of the 
docket, prevents the trial of two or more cases where purely 
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